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In the article I explore how, at the individual level, participation in ​multiple ​networks opens up 
questions regarding the ​classification​ of social activism. The central contention thereby is that as 
mobilization networks increasingly intersect, explicit discursive designations of activism (being 
‘political’ or ‘nonpolitical, social’) by individual activists becomes more prevalent. I substantiate 
this argument with an in-depth exploration of the Syrian uprising. I show that as two distinct 
networks─one that emerged around nonviolent activism, another that emerged around a violent 
uprising─increasingly intersected, activists began to use specific discursive strategies. On the 
one side, a strategy emerged that emphasized the nonpolitical nature of mobilization, thereby 
distancing ​activism discursively from intersecting networks. On the other side, a strategy 
emerged of politicizing collective identities, thereby ​bridging ​discursively various mobilization 
networks. The article thereby adds to existing studies on the intersection between network 
structure and individual activism. The analysis builds on more than a hundred primary sources 
from various rebel groups and relevant local actors in addition to thirty interviews with relevant 
players among activist, rebel and public services organizations. 
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Abstract  
In the article I explore how, at the individual level, participation in ​multiple ​networks opens up 
questions regarding the ​classification​ of social activism. The central contention thereby is that as 
mobilization networks increasingly intersect, explicit discursive designations of activism (being 
‘political’ or ‘nonpolitical, social’) by individual activists becomes more prevalent. I substantiate 
this argument with an in-depth exploration of the Syrian uprising. I show that as two distinct 
networks─one that emerged around nonviolent activism, another that emerged around a violent 
uprising─increasingly intersected, activists began to use specific discursive strategies. On the 
one side, a strategy emerged that emphasized the nonpolitical nature of mobilization, thereby 
distancing ​activism discursively from intersecting networks. On the other side, a strategy 
emerged of politicizing collective identities, thereby ​bridging ​discursively various mobilization 
networks. The article thereby adds to existing studies on the intersection between network 
structure and individual activism. The analysis builds on more than a hundred primary sources 
from various rebel groups and relevant local actors in addition to thirty interviews with relevant 
players among activist, rebel and public services organizations. 
 





How did different social networks in the Syrian uprising influence mobilization strategies of 
individual Syrian activists? In the article I explore how, at the individual level, participation in 
multiple ​networks opens up questions regarding the ​classification​ of social activism. I thereby 
provide a critical reply to studies that explore how the intersection between different types of 
social networks─especially regarding the intersection between ‘local everyday’ and ‘national 
political’ networks─relate to individual mobilization. I argue that typologies of social networks 
do not reflect empirical observation but rather social classification. When exploring the 
relationship between social networks and individual mobilization, what should therefore be 
explored is not how different types of networks intersect, but how the intersection between 
networks shapes discursive classifications of activism. Following this line of argument, the 
central contention of this article is that as mobilization networks increasingly intersect, explicit 
discursive designations of activism (being ‘political’ or ‘nonpolitical, everyday’) by individual 
activists becomes more prevalent.  
 
I substantiate the argument with an in-depth exploration of the Syrian uprising between 2012 
and 2014. The exploration builds on more than a hundred primary sources from various rebel 
groups and relevant local actors, in addition to (Arabic, English and French) secondary sources. 
This is on top of hundreds of sources from governance related actors and around thirty 
interviews with relevant players among activist, rebel and public service organizations.​2 
Interviews took place during four research stays in Istanbul and Gaziantep (Turkey) between 
August 2012 and October 2016.  
 
On the basis of this data, I make four observations. First, I explore the emergence of nonviolent 
activism in the early days of the uprising. I observe that the networks constituting this activism 
did not have clear boundaries, nor were they explicitly political or nonpolitical: They emerged 
around ​social​ activism that constituted an explicitly ​political​ uprising. Second, I explore the 
emergence of the Syrian armed, rebel, uprising in subsequent months. I observe that networks 
within this rebel uprising were also not stable or clearly defined, but that they ​were​ different and 
clearly defined from nonviolent activism. Activists initially organized violent and nonviolent 
mobilization separately, as the use of violent repertoires could delegitimize nonviolent activism. 
Practically, this ensured a clear demarcation between the two types of networks. Third, I show 
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that these two initially independent networks began to intersect around the delivery of public 
services in rebel controlled areas. Two important examples in this respect─which will be 
explored in more depth below─were the rebel controlled cities of Aleppo and Raqqa.  
 
Finally, I observe that as these networks increasingly intersected two types of discursive 
strategies emerged. On the one side, some activists began to emphasize the nonpolitical nature of 
their mobilization: In effect, these activists distanced their activism discursively from rebel 
networks. On the other side, some activists emphasized a collective identity as a unifying 
framework for different types of activism. They thereby bridged discursively the two 
mobilization networks. These strategies were not a structural characteristic of the Syrian 
uprising; nor were they a social mechanism that emerged within its collectivity. Rather, these 
were particular types of strategic choices made by individual activists, related to the networked 
context in which they found themselves.  
 
Social Networks and Contentious Mobilization  
The relation between network structure and individual activism is a much researched topic in 
social movement studies. There are studies that analyze the influence of networks on activist 
recruitment and their mobilization repertoire ​(Diani, 2008; Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Snow, 
Zurcher, & Ekland-Olson, 1980)​; how individual positions of activists within networks shape 
their mobilization efforts ​(Diani & McAdam, 2003; Gould, 1993)​ and the influence networks 
have on the socialization of individuals within these networks ​(Baldassarri & Diani, 2007; 
Passy, 2003; Passy & Giugni, 2001; Singerman, 2004)​. What is similar in these approaches is an 
assumption that the structure and position in a ​singular ​network defines the relationship between 
network and (characteristic of) individual mobilization. As result, these approaches have a 
relatively singular view of the individual-network interaction.  
 
Increasingly, scholars argue that individuals participate in multiple social networks, and that this 
network multiplexity ​(Gould, 1991)​ should be taken into account when analyzing the influence 
of social networks on individual mobilization ​(see also Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Mische, 
2003)​. Although the focus on network multiplexity and intersections is commendable, I critique 
a specific issue that emerges in a number of these contributions: the conflation of typologies of 
social action (especially between everyday and unintentional, and political and intentional) with 
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social networks’ characteristics. Practically, as we will see, this causes problems with, first, the 
conceptualization of network boundaries and, second, internal network structure.  
 
Regarding the first, in reality types of social action are not clearly differentiated ​(Chatterton & 
Pickerill, 2010; Jean-Klein, 2001)​ and neither are the networks that emerge from them. The 
distinction between ‘unintentional everyday’ and ‘intentional political’ activism is often hard to 
make in reality. As result, social network boundaries do not neatly follow these kinds of 
distinctions. It is not a problem when network boundaries are used purely analytically ​(see 
Diani’s work on the green movement, 1995)​ but it does turn problematic when it is implied to 
reflect empirically observable network divisions. This is for instance the case in Clark’s ​(2004) 
exploration of recruitment efforts by Islamist organizations in Yemen and their influence on 
social network formation. She implies a clear separation between political organizations and 
everyday networks; a separation that is difficult to observe in the reality.  
 
Regarding the second, it cannot be assumed that different types of social action result in 
different types of network structure. From this follows that if the relationship between social 
action and network structure is not explicitly defended, the concept of networks is analytically 
empty: What is explored is not the intersection between types of networks but types of activism. 
A good example to clarify this point is the classic study of Gould ​(1991)​ on the importance of 
network multiplexity. In the study he explores the intersection between informal social networks 
(constituted by ties of everyday social solidarity within neighborhoods) and formal 
organizational networks (constituted by battalions of the National Guard) in the Paris commune 
mobilization of 1871. As individual activists could enlist in multiple battalions, a network of 
overlapping enlistments emerged: one that linked battalions across neighborhoods and 
neighborhoods across battalions. Gould shows that the structure of this network correlates with 
levels of neighborhood mobilization and argues that this implies an interdependence between 
neighborhood networks of social solidarity, and the formal networks of the Paris National Guard 
battalions. I would argue instead that without a discussion regarding the specific network 
structure of neighborhood solidarities and National Guard battalions, he renders their networked 
character irrelevant. As result, he ends up analyzing how a single network emerged at the 
intersection of social solidarity and a formal organization. Although interesting in and of itself, it 
means he does ​not ​analyze the influence of network multiplexity.​3  
5 
 This is not to argue that we should not analyze the relationship between networks on the one 
hand, and different types of activism on the other. But one thing should be taken into account. 
The designation of a network’s aim─to be political, everyday, green, LGTBQ+ rights, etc─is not 
one of empirical observation (either related to network boundaries or internal structure) but one 
of social classification. In other words: social networks are not coalitions or organizations. They 
are not coherent entities that have a decision making body. Their boundaries and internal 
structures are not defined in any predictable way by the type of social activity that was at their 
inception─they are historically contingent. As we will see in the Syrian uprising, activists 
increasingly emphasized explicit nonpolitical or political characteristics of their activism─but 
they only did so after two previously independent social networks in the uprising began to 
intersect. When exploring the relationship between social networks and individual mobilization, 
what should therefore be explored is not how different types of networks intersect, but how the 
intersection between networks shapes discursive classifications of activism by individual 
activists.  
 
I am not the first to highlight the relationship between discursive processes and network 
structure. One early and classic approach is the exploration of the extent that collective identities 
and social networks coalesce. It is in a concept such as CatNets ​(Tilly, 1978)​ that this approach 
emerges and is later used in a variety of research on the political representation of social 
cleavages ​(for instance in the framework of the debate on “new” social movements, see Kriesi, 
Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1995)​. But these approaches do not investigate the 
interactions ​between social networks and identity formation. Another classic approach is that of 
Harrison White ​(1992, 2008)​ who inverts social networks and discursive processes: social 
context is created through the networked discursive interactions between agents. It is an 
approach closely aligned to the work of Melucci ​(1996)​ and Touraine ​(2009)​ on the networked 
nature of struggles over historicity. But this inversion of networks into a purely discursive 
construct renders an investigation into the interaction between objective network structure and 
discursive strategies impossible.  
 
One approach to solving the above issues is to explore how, at the individual level, participation 
in ​multiple ​networks opens up questions regarding the ​classification​ of social activism. How do 
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individuals attempt to bridge participation in diverging and intersecting networks discursively? 
The approach I take in this article is closely aligned with Ann Mische ​(2003)​ and her 
contribution regarding the discursive mechanisms that emerge when individuals navigate 
intersecting social networks. She argues that it is ​because of ​the intersection between multiple 
networks that individuals are forced to make explicit the social boundaries that structure their 
activism. As result, she argues, a number of social mechanism emerge: identity qualifying 
(making one's position explicit discursively), temporal cueing (making one’s position bounded 
temporarily), generality shifting (being active at different levels of generality) and multiple 
targeting (targeting multiple audiences).  
 
Focusing on the Syrian uprising, I add to the above scholarship in a number of ways. First, I 
highlight the particular impact violence can have on social network structure: facilitating the 
emergence of insular and hierarchical social networks. Second, I highlight the possible strategic 
use of religion as a discursive classification aimed to unify a diverse range of social activism. 
Taken together, I argue for the use of micro-level mobilization strategies, instead of social 
mechanisms, to explore these discursive observations ​(Fligstein & McAdam, 2011; Jasper, 
2004; Jasper & Duyvendak, 2015; Volpi & Jasper, 2018)​. Although a full strategic approach is 
outside the scope of this article, I will highlight the importance of individual agency in social 
classifications of mobilization. I thereby show how a focus on social network multiplexity can 
be used to bridge structure and agency in studies on discursive processes in contentious 
mobilization. In doing so, I also implicitly─I do not refer to these debates at any moment in the 
following pages─provide a critique to the popular belief that a direct relation exists between 
religion (and especially Islam) and the use of violence in contentious mobilization.  
 
Outline of the Argument  
Taking the above into account, the question that will be explored here is: How has the 
intersection between two different networks in the Syrian uprising influenced Syrian activists’ 
discursive mobilization strategies? In the remainder of the article I make four distinct 
observations. First, I explore the emergence of nonviolent activism in the early days of the 
uprising. This type of activism consisted of peaceful protests, activists coordinating initiatives, 
supporting others or providing emergency aid. Related networks emerged from, and were 
closely related to, everyday networks of kinship, friendship and neighborhood ties. These 
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networks included a variety of organizations─ranging from completely informal to formalized 
organizations─that sometimes worked together, at other times were at odds, but recognized each 
other as belonging to a shared uprising against Bashar al-Assad. These emerging networks did 
not have clear boundaries, nor were they explicitly political or nonpolitical: They emerged 
around ​social​ activism that constituted an explicitly ​political​ uprising.  
 
Second, I observe the emergence of the Syrian armed, rebel, uprising. These activists responded 
to violent repression in kind. First legitimized as purely defensive and gradually turning more 
offensive, these activists initially formed small, insular, groups with friends to take up arms 
against regime forces. Gradually these groups developed into larger rebel organizations that 
challenged the Syrian army and its supporters. These groups, as was the case with nonviolent 
activism, initially emerged from preexisting kinship, friendship and neighborhood ties. They, 
also similar to nonviolent activist groups, sometimes worked together, sometimes were at odds 
with each other but generally recognized that they were part of a (violent) uprising against the 
regime of Bashar al-Assad. Crucially, even though emergent networks within this violent 
activism were not stable or clearly defined, they ​were​ different and clearly defined from 
nonviolent activism. As shown above, activists initially organized violent and nonviolent 
mobilization separately, as the use of violent repertoires could delegitimize nonviolent activism. 
Practically, this ensured a clear demarcation between the two types of networks.  
 
Third, this clear demarcation did not last. The two different networks began to intersect as rebel 
groups took control over various parts of the country in late 2012. In these regions invariably 
problems emerged regarding the delivery of public services (such as food distribution, 
education, the provision of electricity and water)─especially in larger cities. Two important 
examples in this respect were Aleppo and Raqqa, that came under rebel control in mid-2012 and 
early 2013 respectively. Initiatives aimed at addressing these issues were drawn into questions of 
coercive control over limited public resources, while at the same time building on the networks 
that had emerged around nonviolent activism. As result, activists were increasingly forced to 
balance between these two different networks.  
 
Finally, I observe that two types of discursive strategies emerged as result of this balancing act. 
First, a strategy that emphasizes the nonpolitical nature of mobilization. In effect, by stating that 
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their activism is far removed from any political group or party, these activists ​distance ​their 
activism discursively from rebel networks. In contrast, there is a second strategy that centers on 
placing various forms of activism within one cohesive collective identity, activists thereby 
bridge ​discursively these mobilization networks. By arguing that a comprehensive ‘Jihadist’ 
nature of the uprising includes all types of mobilization─from collective violence, to governance 
and social activism─these activists discursively combine various networks into one cohesive 
entity.​4​ These two strategies are not a structural characteristic of the Syrian uprising; nor are they 
a social mechanism that emerges within its collectivity. Rather, they are particular types of 
strategic choices made by individual activists, related to the networked context in which they are 
active.  
 
The Emergence of Nonviolent Activism 
Following the examples of Tunisia and Egypt, in March 2011 a popular uprising emerged in 
Syria ​(Droz-Vincent, 2014 and many more; Khalaf, Ramadan, & Stolleis, 2014; Leenders & 
Heydemann, 2012)​. Starting with localized protests in the southern city of Dara’, within weeks 
they spread across the country. The repertoire of protests was mostly non-violent, but differed 
immensely all the same: from localized and brief protests in cities such as Aleppo and Damascus 
to attempts at establishing large and continuous sit ins in Homs and Hama. Protests erupted 
around the funerals of protesters killed, to night time flash protests in response escalating regime 
repression. Discourse and demands also differed immensely: from overtly secular to infused 
with ethnic and religious references; from protests songs, facebook and youtube pages, to the 
satirical posters that made the town of Kafranbel infamous. And although demands generally 
revolved around ‘freedom’ and an ‘end to regime corruption’, these were always linked to 
localized grievances that ranged from price of bread to release of prisoners ​(see for a detailed 
account della Porta, Donker, Hall, Poljarevic, & Ritter, 2017, Chapter 3)​. 
 
The diversity of social action was mirrored in the diversity of networks on which mobilization 
built. As was true of the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, the Syrian one emerged from 
numerous intersecting local networks rather than being inspired by a charismatic leader and 
building on a limited set of existing organizations. It meant that from the very beginning the 
boundary between everyday and activist networks was almost non-existent ​(Shadid, 2011; 
Zoepf, 2011)​. In regions where clan structures were important─for instance Dara’─they were at 
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the basis of protests ​(Leenders, 2012)​. Cities that had large universities─such as Aleppo─had 
their campuses as early centers of activism.​5​ Protests built on family networks, social networks 
around schools, universities and mosques, and networks of human rights and civil society 
organizations. Despite the importance of social media, in practice any type of pre-existing social 
network proved crucial to the creation of mobilization networks.  
 
Despite the uprising being leaderless, it soon began to institutionalize. As protests spread, 
coordination increased and organizations emerged. These organizations came to be known as the 
Local Coordination Committees (LCCs). Organized at the neighbourhood level, these 
committees met practical needs associated with collective mobilization: organizing protests, 
gathering, disseminating information and providing first aid. In time, the LCCs turned into the 
institutional backbone of peaceful protests throughout the country. This does not mean that they 
constituted a unified network. Nor were they the only type of organization active in the early 
uprising. Although LCCs were supposed to be nationalistic and nonsectarian─and thereby a 
unified network─soon divisions emerged. In some cities, for instance Aleppo, LCCs emerged 
around the university. In other cities, for instance Dara’, they emerged around community 
leaders. In the Kurdish Northeast of the country, Kurdish LCCs emerged (KurdWatch 2011). 
But despite all their differences, activists recognized the need for national coordination and 
eventually a national coordination body of LCCs was founded.​6 
 
Summarized, we can state that the initial uprising was thoroughly networked. This network was 
both of an everyday character and an explicit intentional one; it was social and political; 
explicitly local and national; informal and formalized. The network boundaries between these 
different elements of the Syrian uprising were impossible to draw in practice. Arguably, the 
strength of the initial Syrian uprising was that it combined all these elements into one large 
network. And in those first few weeks and months─no one seemed to mind.  
 
The Emergence of Rebel Activism  
From the start of the uprising protesters debated the use of violence, with the general consensus 
that it would incite more regime violence─and that the regime would prove more powerful in 
the resulting show of force. That said, some protesters used live fire in response to regime 
repression from the very beginning of the uprising (Slackman and Stack 2011).​7​ As months 
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passed and regime repression intensified, some activists founded small militias aimed at 
‘protecting the people’ in various parts of the country.​8​ This process accelerated around August 
2011, following the successful attack on Tripoli by a coalition of Libyan rebel forces. In direct 
response to this example, the general consensus among activists began to shift away from 
nonviolent mobilization to a more violent armed uprising. Syrian militias became more 
numerous as result. Hundreds of rebel groups emerged in the years after. Initially, rebel groups 
were often not more than a few friends or relatives taking up their (often antique) rifles.​9​ In the 
following year (August 2011 – July 2012) they enlarged, became more organized and 
increasingly well trained. The process culminated in the attack on Aleppo and Damascus in 
August 2012 by well armed and organized rebel groups.  
 
From the outset these rebel groups differed organizationally from nonviolent activism: where the 
latter attempted to organize as publically and inclusively as possible, militias had to organize 
secretively and as insular entities. Initially, attempts to provide umbrella organizations for these 
emerging rebel groups (such as the formation of the Free Syrian Army in July 2011) were 
unsuccessful. Distrust between rebel groups was endemic. Additionally, activists attempted to 
keep the use of violence organizationally detached from the non-violent uprising. The creation 
of a Free Syrian Army (FSA) by a number of defected army lieutenants, for instance, was an 
attempt to emphasize the split between the use of violence and nonviolence in the uprising 
(Landis, 2011b; Macfarquhar & Saad, 2012)​. As time went by these groups coalesced into more 
organized rebel organizations; creating alliances and unions with other groups or falling out with 
each other into violent conflict. It resulted in a dense and ever shifting network of rebel groups 
that broadly split along a nonreligious segment, under the banner of the FSA, and a Jihadist 
one. ​10  
 
Four of the most power rebel groups that emerged in the following years were the Zenki 
Movement, Ahrar al-Sham, the Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS).​11​ The 
Zenki movement was a more secular rebel group active in North-West Syria. The group was one 
of the initial participants in a coalition created to attack Aleppo in the summer of 2012. It was 
also a founding member of the anti-ISIS Army of Mujahideen coalition in early 2014 but 
withdrew later that year.​12​ Additionally, the group fought and published statements under an 
FSA banner. ​13​ Second, Ahrar al-Sham emerged as a union from multiple smaller rebel groups in 
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November 2011, and was one of the first effective self declared Salafi-Jihadist group in the 
Syrian uprising. In 2012 and 2013 it was a principal part of the Syrian Islamic Front; and from 
2013 onward of the Islamic Front ​(The Islamic Front, 2013; The Syrian Islamic Front, 2013)​. 
AaS was allied at one time or another with both the FSA, via the Syrian Revolutionary 
Command Council, and the Nusra Front.​14​ Third, the Nusra Front was founded in January 2012 
as a Syrian representation of the global Islamic Jihad ​(al-Joulani, 2012)​. Although long 
suspected, only after the founding of ISIS in April 2013 did Abu Mohammad al-Joulani, the 
leader of the Nusra Front, declare its allegiance and trace its ancestry to al-Qaeda's Zawahiri 
(al-Joulani, 2013)​. On the Syrian battlefield they occasionally joined forces with AaS, for 
instance in the Jaysh al-Fatah organization. ISIS, finally, grew out of a branch of al-Qaeda in 
Iraq (the Islamic State in Iraq, or ISI) and became increasingly powerful and self assured under 
the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. It led to the declaration in April 2013 that they would 
extent their organization to Syria with the aim to create an Islamic State ​(al-Baghdadi, 2013)​.​15 
In short, these four rebel groups constantly shifted alliances and organizational structure 
throughout the duration of the Syrian uprising.  
 
When we look at the above, we can see that the turn to violence resulted in the emergence of a 
new type of network─what can be called rebel networks─that differed in organizational 
structures and was separated from the network of the nonviolent uprising. Regarding the first, 
they started out as much more fragmented and isolated than their nonviolent counterparts, but 
soon coalesced into larger hierarchical and opaque organizations. In other words, whereas 
nonviolent network structures were horizontal and public in nature, rebel organizations were 
hierarchical and closed. Second, as was the case with nonviolent activism, network boundaries 
within ​the rebel uprising were hard to draw. The ever shifting alliances, coalitions, splits and 
fights make that internal network structures were never stable. Also, many of these groups 
explicitly state they are both social and political; rebel group and service provider. Importantly, 
boundaries between rebel and nonviolent networks ​were ​initially relatively easy to draw. As 
violent activism emerged, it was intentionally kept separated from nonviolent activism. In short, 
we can observe during the first year of the Syrian uprising the emergence of a 
first─nonviolent─and second─violent rebel─network that were both separate and independent 
from each other.  
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Intersecting Networks and Public Service Provision  
As rebels took control over various regions in Syria invariably problems emerged regarding the 
delivery of public services─although these problems emerged at different times and around 
various issues.​16​ In this context, people began to organize, distribute and maintain public 
resources. Although specifics differed, in all these cases it meant that previously separated 
networks around rebel and nonviolent mobilization increasingly intersected. Two different cases 
will be used here to explore these intersections in the period between 2012 and 2014: rebel 
controlled Aleppo and Raqqa. Both cities fell under rebel control relatively early on, faced 
explicit problems regarding public service provision relatively quickly (due to high population 
density) and would remain under rebel control for multiple years. At the same time they provide 
two distinct institutional contexts, thereby going some way to showing a generalizability of 
observed dynamics.  
 
Public Service Provision in Aleppo 
In July 2012 rebel groups staged an attack on Aleppo and within days took control over a 
number of neighborhoods, for instance Haidariya and Sheikh Najjar in the north; Sakhour and 
Hanano in the west and Salahuddin and Sukkari in the south. Critically, though, rebels were not 
able to gain control over the entire city, splitting it between a rebel and regime controlled area. 
As result, following the attack, a number of pressing practical issues emerged: the principal 
among which were an acute lack of fuel and flour for bakeries (due to supply routes being cut 
off) and the sudden collapse of trash removal ​(al-Halabi, 2014)​.  
 
First of all, these issues were the source of countless neighborhood and street level initiatives to 
clean roads and manage garbage collection.​17​ In addition, numerous informal, often family 
based, networks emerged that were used to trade flour and propellants between Turkey (or other 
accessible Syrian cities) and Aleppo.​18​ Also more organized associations were founded. One of 
the more effective organizations at the time was the Muslim Youth Council,​19​ which was 
involved in the trade of flour and other aid initiatives.​20​ Another large organization was the Ahali 
Halab Initiative.​21​ The level of organization and commercialization differed between these 
initiatives, but together they constituted a vast informal network that emerged from the uprising 
and preexisting social networks. Some of these associations likened themselves to NGOs in a 
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nascent Syrian civil society, other described themselves as committees coordinating emergency 
relief.  
 
More institutionalized initiatives emerged to govern the city, when it became clear that the 
regime of Bashar al-Assad would not collapse any time soon and a better developed structure 
became necessary to ensure the delivery of electricity, water, security and food. At the beginning 
of 2013, two opposing institutions were founded: on the one side the Local Council of Aleppo 
City ​22​ and on the other side the Islamic Board in Aleppo.​23​ Local activists created the Council as 
a unifying structure for neighborhood councils that had appeared across the city and was based 
in the northern neighborhood of Sheikh Najjar ​(Baczko, Dorronsoro, & Quesnay, 2013; Local 
Council of Aleppo City, 2015)​. The Local Council was formally related to the secular opposition 
led Syrian Interim Government that was founded around the same time. In contrast, the Nusra 
Front, Ahrar al-Sham, and the al-Tawhid Brigade (which incorporated the Zenki movement at 
the time) created the Islamic Board. Both these organizations aimed to organize public service 
provision in the city, such as distributing bread, water and providing electricity, security, and 
waste disposal ​(Hadath Media Center, 2013; Odaba sham, 2015)​.  
 
Thus the initial activist networks and rebel ones began to intersect around the topic of service 
delivery. The Muslim Youth council gave up part of its network to the Islamic Board, the Local 
Council began to coordinate with civil society in providing services and, more generally, the 
Local Council and Islamic Board attempted to implement a governance system that would 
provide oversight over service provision in the city─thereby placing themselves in direct 
intersection with other activist initiatives. But a stable ​status quo​ never materialized. After the 
emergence and expulsion of ISIS in Aleppo in the summer of 2014, a coalition of rebel groups 
reformed the Islamic Board. The Nusra Front, excluded from this coalition, created a rival public 
service organization. It meant that conflicts within the rebel uprising were transposed to service 
delivery on the ground, polarizing social activism in the process ​(General Management of 
Services in Aleppo, 2016; Local Council of Aleppo City, 2016)​. With increasing Russian 
bombardments, and as rebel lines around Aleppo disintegrated in November 2016, this enduring 
conflict stopped in its tracks: any form of normality─which was already heavily degraded 
through the constant use of barrel bombs on the city─collapsed during the final assault on rebel 
held neighborhoods in the city. 
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 Public Service Provision in Raqqa  
From the beginning of rebel control in the city, the context and development of governance in 
Raqqa would be distinctly different from that in Aleppo. First of all, the ways in which the city 
came under rebel control differed markedly. Raqqa was taken over swiftly, completely, and with 
minimal damage to its infrastructure. Also, although public servants in the water and health 
sectors were relatively quickly cut off from their regime paid salaries, those working in 
communication, education and electricity sectors continued to receive their paychecks ​(alAttar, 
2013)​. As such, Raqqa showed how opposition control could develop in a context where all 
these institutions still functioned and where activists had time to prepare for the imminent 
collapse of regime control.  
 
As the takeover of the city became increasingly likely, around September 2012, activists began 
to create small (and underground) networks to create civil society organizations after the fall of 
the city. ​24​ As result, within a month there were 41 civil organizations in the city itself and at least 
eighteen Local Councils across the Raqqa province ​(alAttar, 2013)​─including one in the city 
itself.​25​ It meant that informal grassroot networks institutionalized into formal organizations 
much faster than had been the case in other Syrian cities. 
 
Rebel groups, from their side, found a city with plenty of resources. The first thing these groups 
did after gaining control was to take over specific state buildings.​26​ Ahrar al-Sham, for instance, 
took over a public hospital and the central bank─taking all the money inside in an effort to 
‘secure it for the people’ and setting up its headquarters in it. The Nusra Front took over the 
governorate building, which would later be used by ISIS. The Ahfad Rusul Brigade, a smaller 
Jihadist group, set up their headquarters at the old train station ​(alAttar, 2013)​. Additionally, 
these groups occupied schools and other public buildings across the city to use them as local 
bases. These takeovers took place rather haphazardly and had the distinct feel of a scramble for 
the spoils of victory. On top of this many families, according to a member of the former Local 
Council of Raqqa, flocked to the various rebel groups in search of security─which meant that 
their size and power increased rapidly.​27  
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As they controlled most state buildings, service provision in the city fragmented along the 
various rebel groups. The fragmentation severely deteriorated the overall quality of public 
services provided. Activists in the Local Council of Raqqa tried to address this problem, except 
that they had little power or money to be active effectively: The Council faced an acute lack of 
experience and was severely underfunded.​28​ The need for resources and protection forced local 
activists─and above all those from the Local Council─to seek aid from rebel groups. Ahrar 
al-Sham reacted positively to these proposals (as long as they would be able to sell it as their 
own activities) and soon even the Nusra Front took action. As a member of the former council 
recalled:  
 
We received an invitation from the leader of the Nusra Front: to come and pay a visit. 
There was no way that we could refuse this invitation. So we decided to go─all of us. 
We went fearing for our lives. The strange thing was: he said he supported us, 
thought that we did great work and that─if needed─we could always call on the 
Nusra Front for protection. No one expected this. Not from them.​29 
 
Summarized, we can see that the institutional development of public service provision was 
different in Aleppo and Raqqa. In Aleppo only certain neighborhoods were conquered, which 
meant that the rebel groups could not overpower non-rebel initiatives. In Raqqa the opposite 
happened. But despite these differences, in both instances the necessity of providing public 
services in regions outside direct control of the state meant that two different networks─one 
emerging around nonviolent, the other around violent activism─were forced to interact. As was 
the case in Aleppo, in Raqqa this specific situation would not last. Conflicts between rebel 
groups soon escalated. Non-jihadist groups were overpowered by Jihadist ones─specifically 
Ahrar al-Sham and the Nusra Front. The latter would relocate to the nearby town of Tabqa as 
ISIS depleted its ranks. The Ahfad Rusul brigade, the smaller Jihadist group mentioned above, 
would be wiped out around the same time. It meant that in mid-2013 Ahrar al-Sham and ISIS 
remained, with the Nusra Front closeby. At the beginning of 2014, ISIS would outgun the other 
two and take full control over the city. Soon any type of independent civil initiative was 
rendered impossible.​30  
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Political and Social Activism as Discursive Strategy  
As we have seen above, the initial networks of the Syrian nonviolent uprising were both of an 
everyday character and an explicit intentional one. They were social ​and ​political; explicitly 
local and national; informal and formalized─all combined. The second generation of networks 
that emerged─stemming from the rebel uprising─often combined their violent repertoire of 
action with humanitarian initiatives. But the internal structure of these networks differed (being 
more insular and hierarchical) and emerged as independent from this first generation activist 
network. It was shown above that these two activist networks eventually increasingly intersected 
around the provision of public services in rebel controlled areas.  
 
In the final section of this paper I demonstrate how these forced interactions triggered two 
specific discursive strategies. First, many Syrian activists─including from the two cities 
explored above─began to argue for the explicit non-political nature of their activism, thereby 
creating a discursive distance between the two types of networks. Second, other activists 
discursively united various forms of activism under a common (in this case religious) collective 
identity, thereby bridging the two networks around a shared project of strengthening political 
power of a collectivity. Both these strategies indicated that the question of what is political 
turned into a strategic issue as individuals found themselves navigating intersecting mobilization 
networks. In other words, the Syrian case shows that when exploring the relationship between 
social networks and individual mobilization, what should be explored is not how different types 
of networks intersect, but how the intersection between networks shapes discursive 
classifications of activism by individual activists.  
 
Nonpolitical activism 
Following the first strategy, activists explicitly labeled their activism as ‘nonpolitical’. In 
essence, they described their activism as an antonym to political mobilization: either as 
humanitarian, civic, social or any other categorization. Activists thereby distanced themselves 
from what they described as the political project of a variety of groups, which they saw to be 
either corrupted, sectarian, at a stalemate or more generally ineffective. Crucially, there was no 
consensus between activists on where the boundary between ‘political’ and ‘nonpolitical’ was 
located: Local Councils were described as non-political, or political; opposition organizations 
that provided public services were described alternatively as an inherent component to rebel 
17 
political projects or crucial non-political humanitarian organizations. The self-description of 
being non-political is used to ​discursively distance​ activism from other activist organizations. 
Where before activist networks were clearly differentiated in practice, their increasing 
intersections necessitated a ​discursive strategy ​of differentiation─a ‘political’ versus 
‘non-political’ distinction served this purpose.  
 
This strategy could be observed among numerous activists and organizations in the Syrian 
uprising. Islamic organizations, for instance the Syrian Islamic Council (SIC)─founded by 
influential Syrian Islamic scholars such as the Rifai’ brothers as a counterweight against 
‘foreign’ Salafist influences in the Syrian uprising─explicitly argued that they were a 
nonpolitical, ‘purely religious’, organizations. Taking their ​raison d’etre​ into account, it is 
striking that the SIC made such a statement. It is even more striking as the SIC was directly 
related to many opposition organizations in Syria itself. As a spokesperson stated in an interview 
with the author: ‘We are a religious umbrella organization, representing and advising religious 
authorities in Syrian opposition organizations. We don’t have anything to do with politics or 
anything of that sort. We are purely religious.’​31​ The same strategy could be observed among 
activists who combined an aversion for institutionalization with a nonpolitical self description, 
thereby supporting the Syrian population without interacting with ‘corrupting’ political forces or 
even media outlets. One activist stated that she became active in an Aleppo aid organization 
during the uprising as her brothers went to fight for the FSA. She continued to be active in the 
years since, but increasingly came to realize the importance of staying away from politics and 
media: ‘It corrupts and destroys everything it touches.’​32  
 
These were two examples of a more widely used discursive strategy. Many Syrian activists 
would increasingly emphasize the nonpolitical nature of their activism from late 2012 onward. 
The same applies to Syrian aid organizations that are active abroad, for instance in Lebanon─as 
discussed by Laura Ruiz de Elvira in her article ​From Local Revolutionary Action to Exiled 
Humanitarian Work ​(forthcoming). The strict articulation of a boundary between ‘political’ and 
‘nonpolitical’ activism emerged in a context that was much more diffuse in reality. In the end, it 
was ​because ​networks intersected, and many actors shifted between them, that explicit 
articulation of political positionality emerged as a discursive strategy among Syrian activists.  
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Politicizing Collective Identities 
This discursive strategy was premised on the argument that all types of activism were in support 
of one specific collectivity─in our example Sunni Muslims─and thereby constituted a cohesive 
network. It resulted in the polarization of social cleavages and facilitated a process of 
sectarianization in the Syrian conflict. Divisions between religious and secular; Kurdish against 
Arab; Allawi, Sunni, Shia and/or Christian identities were used to discursively ​divide​ the Syrian 
nation, and ​unify​ any type of (rebel, civic, nonviolent, etc) activism that took place within these 
groups. All types of activism thereby became part of an effort to strengthen the collective and 
thereby served the political aim of dominance in the Syrian conflict. In Raqqa and Aleppo, 
during the period under investigation here, this strategy was most obviously used in relation to 
Islamic (Sunni) activism and the concept of Jihad.  
 
Ahrar al-Sham, for instance, described itself as ‘comprehensive Islamic reform movement [... 
and as] a military, political, social, comprehensive Islamic entity with the aim to topple the 
Assad regime’ ​(Ahrar al-Sham, 2015)​. The group thereby placed a range of activities within an 
Islamic social reform project. Respondents from Raqqa complained about the extent that Ahrar 
al-Sham enforced moral norms in public life when they first conquered the city. An effort that 
was facilitated by the numerous Dawah centers the group founded across the country ​(Ahrar 
al-Sham, 2013a, 2013b)​ and in the Raqqa province itself.​34​ It seemed that Ahrar al-Sham truly 
attempted, through any means necessary, to give an image that they were active not only as rebel 
group but ‘a comprehensive Islamic reform movement’ ​(Ahrar al-Sham, 2015)​ that also 
provided services, security and education.  
 
A similar point was made regarding the Islamic Board of Aleppo, specifically in relation to the 
concept of Jihad. ​35​ An Aleppo based activist stated that he initially supported the Islamic Board 
because of its experience in governance (gained from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq) and its 
vision of building proper governing structures in the city:​36 
 
Most importantly, [the Islamic Board] was the institutional representation of the 
Jihad. A large majority of fighters in Syria calls themselves Jihadist. The uprising 
itself was not Islamic, but an Islamic identity was clearly present within it. The 
Islamic Board in Aleppo appropriated this identity.​37  
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 Appropriating this Jihadist identity also meant that the Board could appropriate existing Islamic 
social initiatives in the city─as they were framed to be belong to a larger Jihadist effort. The 
previously mentioned Muslim Youth Council, for instance, was asked to hand over its network 
of food distribution to the Islamic Board. They seemingly complied without much resistance, 
fully supporting the Islamic Board’s claim to Islamic legitimacy and Jihadist representation.​38 
Either positively or negatively, many living in Aleppo during these days corroborated the image 
of a powerful Islamic Board that appropriated a wide range of initiatives in the city ​(al-Halabi, 
2014)​.​39​ This was only possible with the support of rebel groups and its appropriation of a 
Jihadist identity. The most extreme expression of such a project would eventually be, of course, 
ISIS.  
 
In other words: Jihad was used as concept to bind together all types of activism in a discursive 
framework that explicitly places (Sunni) Muslims against other religious and ethnic groups. It 
bridges the political and everyday, by rendering all parts of social activity a cohesive 
socio-political project. As such, the statement that Jihad constituted a comprehensive project to 
strengthen the Sunni community through a combination of violent, nonviolent, social, 
bureaucratic, educational and political action became much more pervasive as rebels took 
control over Syrian cities. In reality, this project was by far not as cohesive as many jihadist 
would have wanted. But it was the intersection between previously differentiated networks that 
made their unification possible, a unification facilitated by a discursive strategy of ​bridging 
various types of social activism within one comprehensive (but exclusivist) collective identity.  
 
Conclusion 
In the preceding I showed, building on a wide range of primary and secondary sources, the 
emergence of two distinct types of mobilization networks in the Syrian uprising: one around 
nonviolent activism and another around an armed uprising. I subsequently explored how these 
networks intersected around issues of public service delivery in rebel controlled Aleppo and 
Raqqa. Finally, then, I observed that as mobilization networks increasingly intersected, explicit 
discursive classifications of activism became increasingly important. On the one side, there was 
a strategy to emphasize the nonpolitical nature of mobilization, thereby ​distancing ​activism 
discursively from intersecting networks. On the other side, there was a strategy of unifying 
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diverse forms of activism as supporting a single collectivity, thereby ​bridging ​discursively 
various mobilization networks. 
 
What insights can be drawn from the above cases? First of all, that classifications of social 
networks (as either political or social, intentional or everyday, local or national) are often subject 
to strategic considerations by individual activists. Second, it shows that discursive classifications 
of activism on the one side and network boundaries on the other do not have to (and often do 
not) correspond. Finally, it shows that the influence of social networks on individual 
mobilization can stem from the intersection between networks as such, and does not directly 
have to relate to any specific characteristics of these networks themselves.  
 
These three insights directly relate to debates on the relation between social networks and 
individual mobilization. There is an increased recognition that individuals participate in multiple 
social networks. What is rather problematic, though, is the related recurring conflation of 
typologies of social action (for instance everyday and unintentional opposed to political and 
intentional) with social networks’ structure and boundaries. Network boundaries and internal 
network structure do not have to correspond directly to types of social action─they are much 
more historically contingent. A nominal division between networks on their initial political or 
everyday function is hard to defend. The boundary between the everyday and politics is a 
discursive one and is subject to continuous change. The central contention that I thereby made 
is, simply, the following: increasing intersections between mobilization networks facilitates 
explicit discursive designations of types of activism. 
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